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Abstract
Epistemic planning — planning with knowledge and belief — is essential in many multi-agent and human-agent
interaction domains. Most state-of-the-art epistemic planners solve this problem by compiling to propositional classi-
cal planning, for example, generating all possible knowledge atoms, or compiling epistemic formula to normal forms.
However, these methods become computationally infeasible as problems grow. In this paper, we decompose epis-
temic planning by delegating reasoning about epistemic formula to an external solver. We do this by modelling the
problem using functional STRIPS, which is more expressive than standard STRIPS and supports the use of external,
black-box functions within action models. Exploiting recent work that demonstrates the relationship between what
an agent ‘sees’ and what it knows, we allow modellers to provide new implementations of externals functions. These
define what agents see in their environment, allowing new epistemic logics to be defined without changing the plan-
ner. As a result, it increases the capability and flexibility of the epistemic model itself, and avoids the exponential
pre-compilation step. We ran evaluations on well-known epistemic planning benchmarks to compare with an existing
state-of-the-art planner, and on new scenarios based on different external functions. The results show that our plan-
ner scales significantly better than the state-of-the-art planner against which we compared, and can express problems
more succinctly.
Keywords: Epistemic Planning, Functional STRIPS, Perspective Models
1. Introduction
Automated planning is a model-based approach to study sequential decision problems in AI [1]. Planning models
describe the environment and the agents with concise planning languages, such as STRIPS. It then submits the de-
scription of the model to a general problem solver in order to find a sequence of actions to achieve a certain desired
goal state. The description of the problem, in general, tracks the changes in the state of the environment. However, in
many scenarios, an agent needs to reason about the knowledge or belief of other agents in the environment. This con-
cept is known as epistemic planning [2], a research topic that brings together the knowledge reasoning and planning
communities.
Epistemic logic is a formal account to perform inferences and updates about an agent’s own knowledge and belief,
including group and common knowledge in the presence of multiple agents [3]. Epistemic planning is concerned
about action theories that can reason not only about variables representing the state of the world, but also the belief
and knowledge that other agents have about those variables. Thus, epistemic planning intends to find the best course
of action taking into account practical performance considerations when reasoning about knowledge and beliefs [2].
Bolander and Andersen (2011) first used event-based models to study epistemic planning in both single and multi
agent environments, and gave a formal definition of epistemic planning problems using Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL) [4].
There are typically two frameworks in which epistemic planning are studied. First, is to use DEL. This line of
research investigates the decidability and complexity of epistemic planning and studies what type of problems it can
solve [5, 6, 7]. The second is to extend existing planning languages and solvers to epistemic tasks [8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
In this paper, we take the latter approach.
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The complexity of epistemic planning is undecidable in the general case. Thus, one of the main challenges of
epistemic planning concerns computational efficiency. The dominant approach in this area it to rely on compilations.
These solutions pre-compile epistemic planning problems into classical planning problems, using off-the-shelf clas-
sical planners to find solutions [8, 9, 10, 11]; or pre-compile the epistemic formulae into specific normal forms for
better performance during search [6, 7]. Such approaches have shown to be fast at planning, but the compilation is
computationally expensive.
This paper departs from previous approaches in two significant ways. First, we propose a model that exploits
recent insights defining what an agent knows as a function of what it ‘sees’ [13, 14]. Cooper et al. [13] define ‘seeing
relations’ as modal operators that ‘see’ whether a proposition is true, and then define knowledge of a proposition p as
Kip ↔ p ∧ S ip; that is, if p is true and agent sees p, then it knows p. Thus, the seeing modal operator is equivalent to
the ‘knowing whether’ operator [15, 16]. We generalise the notion of seeing relations to perspective functions, which
are functions that determine which variables an agent sees. The domain of variables can be discrete or continuous, not
just propositional. The basic implementation of perspective functions is just the same as seeing relations, however, we
show that by changing the definition of perspective functions, we can establish new epistemic logics tailored to specific
domains, such as Big Brother Logic [14]: a logic about visibility and knowledge in two-dimensional Euclidean planes.
Second, we show how to integrate perspective functions within functional STRIPS models as external functions
[17]. External functions are black-box functions implanted in a programming language (in our case, C++), that can
be called within action models. Epistemic reasoning is delegated to external functions, where epistemic formulae
are evaluated lazily, avoiding the exponential blow-up from epistemic formulae present in other compilation-based
approaches. This delegation effectively decomposes epistemic reasoning from search, and allows us to implement our
approach in any functional STRIPS planner that supports external functions. Further, the modeller can implement
new perspective functions that are tied to specific domains, effectively defining new external solvers.
In our experiments we use a width-based functional STRIPS planner [17] that is able to evaluate the truth value
of epistemic fluents with external solvers, and solve a wide range of epistemic problems efficiently, included but not
limited to, nested knowledge, distributed knowledge and common knowledge. We also show how modellers can im-
plement different perspective functions as external functions in the functional STRIPS language, enabling the use of
domain-dependent epistemic logics. Departing from propositional logic give us flexibility to encode expressive epis-
temic formulae concisely. We compare our approach to a state-of-the-art epistemic planner that relies on a compilation
to classical planning [8]. The results show that, unlike in the compilation based approaches, the depth of nesting and
the number of agents does not affect our performance, avoiding the exponential blow up due to our lazy evaluation of
epistemic formulae.
In the following sections we give a brief background on both epistemic logic and epistemic planning (Section 2).
We then introduce a new model, the agent perspective model (Section 3). We discuss implementation details using a
functional STRIPS planner (Section 4), and report experiments on several well-known benchmarks, along with two
new scenarios to demonstrate the expressiveness of the proposed approach (Section 5).
2. Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the three main areas related to this work: (1) classical planning; (2) epistemic
logic; and (3) epistemic planning.
2.1. Classical Planning
Planning is the model based approach to action selection in AI, where the model is used to reason about which
action an agent should do next [1]. Models vary depending on the assumptions imposed on the dynamics of the
world, from classical where all actions have deterministic instantaneous effects and the world is fully known, up
to temporal or POMDP models, where actions have durations or belief distributions about the state of the world.
Models are described concisely through declarative languages such as STRIPS and PDDL [18, 19], general enough
to allow the encoding of different problems, while at the same time revealing important structural information that
allow planners to scale up. In fact, most planners rely on exploiting the structure revealed in the action theory to guide
the search of solutions, from the very first general problem solver [20] up to the latest computational approaches
based on SAT, and heuristic search [21, 22]. On the other hand, declarative languages have limited the scope of
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planning, as certain environments representing planning models are difficult to encode declaratively, but are easily
defined through simulators such as the Atari video games [23]. Consequently, a new family of width-based planners
[24, 25, 26] have been proposed, broadening the scope of planning and have been shown to scale-up even when the
planning model is described through simulators, only requiring the exposure of the state variables, but not imposing
any syntax restriction on the action theory [17], where the denotation of some symbols can be given procedurally
through simulators or by external theories.
In this paper we focus on epistemic planning, which considers the classical planning model as a tuple S =
〈S , s0, SG, Act, A, f , c〉 where S is a set of states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, SG ⊆ S is the set of goal states, Act is the
set of actions, A(s) is the subset actions applicable in state s, f is the transition function so that f (a, s) represents the
state s′ that results from doing action a in the state s, and c(a, s) is a cost function. The solution to a classical planning
model S, called a plan, is a sequence of actions that maps the initial state into a goal state, i.e., π = 〈a0, . . . , an〉 is
a plan if there is a sequence of states s0, . . . , sn+1 such that ai ∈ A(si) and si+1 = f (ai, si) for i = 0, . . . , n such that
sn+1 ∈ SG. The cost of plan π is given by the sum of action costs c(ai, si) and a plan is optimal if there is no plan with
smaller cost.
A classical planning model can be represented in STRIPS by a tuple P = 〈F,O, I,G〉 where: F is the set of all
possible facts or propositions, O the set of all actions, I ⊆ F a set of all true facts in the initial situation, and G ⊆ F a
set of facts that needs to be true as the goal conditions.
Besides the model, a solver, which is also called a planner, plays another important role in planning. One of the
most successful computational approaches to planning is heuristic search. Besides the choice of search algorithm,
the key feature which distinguishes planners is the heuristic function chosen [27]. To achieve good performance,
the heuristic funstions should be as informed as possible. For example, one of the current best-performing planner,
LAMA, uses a landmark-based heuristic derived from the model [22] along with other delete-relaxation heuristics [1].
The downside is that most heuristics require the model to be encoded in STRIPS or PDDL, but not all the problem
can be easy to modeled declaratively.
The standard planning languages and solvers do not support the use of procedures or external theories. One
exception is the FS planner [28], that supports the Functional STRIPS language [29], where the denotation of (non-
fluent) function symbols can be given extensionally by means of atoms, or intensionally by means of procedures.
Procedures also appear as an extension of PDDL under the name of semantic attachments [30]. The reason why
procedures are not “first-class citizens” in planning languages is that there was no clear way to deal with them that
is both general and effective. Recently, a new family of algorithms have been proposed in classical planning known
as Width-based planning [24]. The latest planner known as Best-First Width Search (BFWS) [31], has been shown to
scale up even in the presence of functional symbols defined procedurally [17]. BFWS exploits a concept called novelty
in order to prune or guide the search. The novelty of a new state is determined by the presence of values in its state
variables that are seen for the first time during the search. It keeps checking when generating search nodes whether
there is something novel about them. The novelty of the node is the size of the minimal tuple of state variables that
are seen for the fist time during the search.
The f-STRIPS planner using BWFS has been compared over 380 problems with respect of the performance of
FF* [32], LAMA-11 [22], and BFWS( f5) [31]. The results show that the f-STRIPS BFWS planner performances is
as good as BFWS( f5), which relies on a STRIPS model, and slightly better than LAMA-11. It is worth to mention
that FF and LAMA have been the top-performing planners for last 15 years, and BFWS( f5) has been shown to win
the agile track in the last International Planning Competition 2018, and is a state-of-art planner for classical planning.
The f-STRIPS BFWS planner thus can cope with externally defined functional symbols while performing well with
respect to other planners. Therefore, we choose their planner as our developing tool.1
2.2. Epistemic Logic
In this section, we give the necessary preliminaries for epistemic logic – the logic of knowledge. Knowledge in a
multi-agent system is not only about the environment, but also about the agents’ knowledge about the environment,
and of agents’ knowledge of others’ knowledge about the environment, and so on.
1 The planner is available through https://github.com/aig-upf/2017-planning-with-simulators .
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Fagin et al. [33] provides a formal definition of epistemic logic as follows. Given a set of countable set of all
primitive propositions Prop = {p1, p2, ...} and a finite set of agents Agt = {a1, a2, ...}, the syntax for epistemic logic is
defined as:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | Kiϕ,
in which p ∈ Prop and i ∈ Agt.
Kiϕ represents that agent i knows proposition ϕ, ¬ means negation and ∧ means conjunction. Other operators
such as disjunction and implication can be defined in the usual way.
Fagin et al. [33] define the semantics of epistemic logic using Kripke structures, as standard in modal logic. A
Kripke structure is a tuple M = (S , π,K1, . . . ,Kn) where:
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• π(s) is an interpretation function: Prop 7→ {true | f alse}; and
• K1 . . .Kn represents the accessibility relations over states for each of the n agents in Agt.
Given a state s and a proposition p, the evaluation of p over s is π(s)(p). If p is true in s, then π(s)(p) must be
true, and vice-versa. Ki for agent i is a binary relation over states, which is the key to reason about knowledge. For
any pair of states s and t, if (s, t) ∈ Ki, then we can say agent i cannot distinguish between t and s when in state s. In
other words, if agent i is in s, the agent can consider t as the current state based on all the information it can obtain
from state s. With this definition of Kripke structure, we can define the semantics of knowledge.
Given a state s, a proposition p, a propositional formula ϕ and a Kripke structureM, the truth of two basic formulae
are defined as follows:
• (M, s)  p iff π(s)(p)=true
• (M, s)  Kiϕ iff (M, t)  ϕ for all such that (s, t) ∈ Ki
(M, s)  p represents p is true at (M, s), which means, the evaluation of p in state s, π(s)(p) must be true. Standard
propositional logic rules define conjunction and negation. (M, s)  Kiϕ is defined by agent ϕ being true at all worlds t
reachable from s via the accessibility relationKi. This allows knowledge to be nested; for example, KaKbp represents
that agent a knows that agent b knows p, which means p is true at all worlds reachable by applying accessibility
relationKa followed by Kb.
From these basic operators, the concept of group knowledge can be defined. For this, the grammar above is
extended to:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | Kiϕ | EGϕ | DGϕ | CGϕ,
in which p ∈ Prop, i ∈ Agt, andG is a non-empty set of agents such thatG ⊆ Agt.
EGϕ represents that everyone in groupG knows ϕ andCGϕ represents that it is commonly known in groupG that ϕ
is true, which means that everyone knows ϕ, and everyone knows that everyone knows ϕ, ad infinitum. DGϕ represents
distributed knowledge, which means we combine the knowledge of the set of agents G such that G knows ϕ, even
though it may be that no individual in the group knows ϕ.
The semantics for these group operators are defined as follows:
• (M, s)  EGϕ iff (M, s)  Kiϕ for all i ∈ G;
• (M, s)  CGϕ iff (M, t)  ϕ for all t that are G-reachable from s
• (M, s)  DGϕ iff (M, t)  ϕ for all t such that (s, t) ∈ ∩i∈GKi
By definition, (M, s)  EGϕ will be true, if and only if, ϕ is known by all agents in G. Common knowledge in
world s, (M, s)  CGϕ is defined as: in all worlds t, which are reachable by following the accessibility relations of
all agents in G, ϕ is true. For distributed knowledge, (M, s)  DGϕ is true, if and only if, in all the possible worlds
that any one agent fromG consider possible, ϕ is true; in other words, we eliminate worlds that any agent inG knows
to be impossible.
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a1
(0.0, 0.0)
a2
(5.2, 0.0)
b1
(−2.6, 0.0)
b2
(2.6, 0.0)
b3
(7.8, 0.0)
b4
(2.6, 2.3)
Figure 1: Example for big brother logic
2.2.1. Seeing and Knowledge
Recently Gasquet et al.[14] noted the relationship between what an agent sees and what it knows. They define a
more specific task of logically modeling and reasoning about cooperating tasks of vision-based agents, which they
called Big Brother Logic (BBL). Their framework models multi-agent knowledge in a continuous environment of
vision, which has great potential applications such as reasoning over cameras inputs, autonomous robots and vehicles.
They introduced the semantics of their model and its extensions on natural geometric models.
In their scenario, agents are stationary cameras in a Euclidean plane R2, and they set the assumptions that those
cameras can see anything in their sight range, and they do not have volume, which means they would not block others’
sight. They extend Fagin et al.’s logic [33] by noting that, at any point in time, what an agent knows, including nested
knowledge, can be derived directly from what it can see in the current state. In brief, instead of Kripke frames, they
define a geometric model as (pos, dir, ang), in which:
• pos : Agt → R2
• dir : Agt → U
• ang : Agt → [0, 2π)
in which U is the set of unit vectors of R2, the pos function gives the position of each agent, the dir function gives the
direction that each agent is facing, and the function ang gives the angle of view for each agent.
A model is defined as (pos, ang,D,R), in which pos and ang are as above, D is the set of dir functions and R the
set of equivlance relations, one for each agent a, defined as:
Ra = {(dir, dir
′) ∈ D2 | for all b , a, dir(b) = dir′(b)}
In this context, standard propositional logic is extended with the binary operator a ⊲ b, which represents that “a sees
b”. This is defined as:
• (pos, ang,D,R), dir  a ⊲ b iff pos(b) ∈ Cpos(a),dir(a),ang(a),
in which Cpos(a),dir(a),ang(a) is the field of vision that begins at pos(a) from direction dir(a) and goes ang(a) degrees in
a counter-clockwise direction.
Figure 1 shows an example with two agents, a1 and a2, and model ((0.0, 0.0), 60
◦,D,R) and ((5.2, 0.0), 60◦,D,R)
respectively, along with four objects, b1, b2, b3 and b4. Based on the current state, for agent a1, we have:
(pos, ang,D,R), dir  a1 ⊲ a2; (pos, ang,D,R), dir  a1 ⊲ b2; and, (pos, ang,D,R), dir  a1 ⊲ b3.
From this, they show the relationship between seeing and knowing. For example, Ka(b ⊲ c) is defined as a ⊲ b∧ a ⊲
c ∧ b ⊲ c.
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Gasquet et al. [14] also define a common knowledge operator, defined in a similar manner to that of Fagin et al.’s
definition based onG-reachable worlds [33]. In Figure 1, the formulaC{a1 ,a2}loc(b2)=(2.6,0.0) holds because a1 and a2 can
both see b2, and can both see that each other sees b2, etc.
Cooper et al. [13] adopted Gasquet et al. [14]’s idea of modelling an agent’s knowledge based on what it sees, and
generalised it to seeing propositions, rather than to just to seeing other agents in a Euclidean plane. They extended
Fagin et al.’s definition by adding an extra formula α, which represents formula about what can be seen:
α ::= p | S ip | S iα
ϕ ::= α | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | Kiϕ,
in which p ∈ PVar (the set of propositional variables) and i ∈ Agt. The grammar for α defines how to represent
visibility relations. S iα can be read as “agent i sees α”. Note the syntactic restriction that agents can only see atomic
propositions or nestings of seeing relationships that see atomic propositions.
From this, they define knowledge using the equivalences Kip ↔ p ∧ S ip and Ki¬p ↔ ¬p ∧ S ip. This tight
correspondence between seeing and knowledge is intuitive: an agent knows p is true if p is true and the agent can see
the variable p. Such a relationship is the same as the relationship between knowing something is true and knowing
whether something is true [16, 15]. In fact, in early drafts of the work available online, Cooper et al. [13], S i was
written KWi and was called the “knowing whether” operator.
Comparing these two bodies of work, Gasquet et al. [14] use a geometric model to represent the environment and
derive knowledge from this by checking the agents’ line of sight. Their idea is literally matching the phrase “Seeing
is believing”. However, their logic is constrained only to vision in physical spaces. While in Cooper et al. [13]’s
world, the seeing operator applies to propositional variables, and thus visibility can be interpreted more abstractly; for
example, ‘seeing’ (hearing) a message over a telephone.
The current paper generalises seeing relations to perspective functions, which are domain-dependent functions
defining what agents see in particular states. The result is more flexible than seeing relations, and allows Big Brother
Logic to be defined with a simple perspective function, as well as new perspective functions for other domains; for
example, Big Brother Logic in three-dimensional planes, or visibility of messages on a social network.
2.3. Epistemic Planning
Bolander and Andersen [2] introduce the concept of epistemic planning, and define it in both single agent and
multi-agent domain. Their planning framework is defined in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) [34], which has been
shown to be undecidable in general, but with decidable fragements [35]. In addition, they also provided a solution to
PSPACE-hardness of the plan verification problem. This formalism has been used to explore theoretical properties
of epistemic planning; for example, Engesser et al. [36] used concepts of perspective shifting to reason about other’s
contribution to joint goals. Along with implicit coordination actions, their model can solve some problems elegantly
without communication between agents.
Since epistemic planning was formalized in DEL, there has been substantial work on DEL-based planning. How-
ever, in this paper, our focus is on the design, implementation, and evaluation of planning tools, rather than on
logic-based models of planning. In this section, we focus on research in epistemic planning that is focused on the
design, implementation, and evaluation of planning algorithms.
A handful of researchers in the planning field focus on leveraging existing planners to solve epistemic problems.
Muise et al. [8] proposed an approach to multi-agent epistemic planning with nested belief, non-homogeneous agents,
co-present observation, and the ability for one agent to reason as if it were the other. Generally, compiled an epistemic
logic problem into a classical planning problem by grounding epistemic fluents into propositional fluents and using
additional conditional effects of actions to enforce desirable properties of belief. They evaluated their approach on the
Corridor [10] problem and the Grapevine problem, which is a combination of Corridor and Gossip [37]. Their results
show that their approach is able to solve the planning task within a typically short time, but the compilation time to
generate fluents and conditional effects is exponential in the size of the original problem.
Simultaneously, Kominis and Geffner [10] adopted methods from partially-observable planning for representing
beliefs of a single agent, and converted that method to handle multi-agent setting. They define three kinds of actions
sets O, N and U. O represents all physical actions, which is the same O as in classical planning. The actions set
N denotes a set of sensing actions, which can be used to infer knowledge. The last action set U is used to update
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any of the fact ϕ. They are able to use their model to encode epistemic planning problems, and can convert their
model to a classical planning model using standard compilation techniques for partially-observable planning. They
evaluated their model onMuddy Children, Sum andWord Rooms [10] domains. Their results show that their model
is able to handle solve all cases presented, however, the performance as measured by time and depth of the optimal
plan is indirectly related to the problem scope and planning algorithm. For example, by using two different planners,
A∗(hmax) and BFS(hadd), the Muddy Children test case with seven children, the time consumed by BFS(hadd) is only
half of A∗(hmax), while for other problems, there is little difference between the two.
Since Kominis and Geffner, and Muise et al.’s approach the problem in a similar way (compilation to classical
planning) their results are similar in a general way. However, the methods they used are different, so, their work and
results have diverse limitations and strengths. For Muise et al.’s work, they managed to modeling nested beliefs with-
out explicit or implicit Kripke structures, which means they can only represent literals, while Kominis and Geffner’s
work is able to handle arbitrary formulae. Furthermore, Muise et al.’s model does not have the strict common initial
knowledge setting found in Kominis and Geffner, and does not have the constraint that all action effects are commonly
known to all the agents. Therefore, Muise et al.’s model allows them to model beliefs, which might be not what is
actual true in the world state, rather just model knowledge. In other words, they can handle different agents having
different belief about the same fluent.
More recently, rather than compiling epistemic planning problems into classic planning, Huang et al. built a na-
tive multi-agent epistemic planner, and proposed a general representation framework for multi-agent epistemic prob-
lems [6]. They considered the whole multi-agent epistemic planning task from a third person point of view. In
addition, based on a well-established concepts of believe change algorithms (both revision and update algorithms),
they design and implemented an algorithm to encode belief change as the result of planning actions. Catering to
their ideas and algorithms, they developed a planner called MEPK. They evaluated their approach with Grapevine,
Hexa Game and Gossip, among others. From their results, it is clear that their approach can handle a variety of
problems, and performance on some problems is better than other approaches. While this approach is different from
Kominis and Geffner and Muise et al., it still requires a compilation phase before planning to re-write epistemic for-
mula into a specific normal form called alternating cover disjunctive formulas (ACDF) [38]. The ACDF formula is
worst-case exponentially longer than the original formula. The results show that this step is of similar computational
burden as either Kominis and Geffner or Muise et al.. In addition, building a native planner to solve an epistemic
planning problem makes it more difficult to take advantage of recent advances in other areas of planning.
3. A Model of Epistemic Planning using Perspectives
In this section, we define a syntax and semantics of our agent perspective model. Our idea is based on that of Big
Brother Logic [14] and Cooper et al.’s seeing operators [13]. The syntax and semantics of our model is introduced,
including distributed knowledge and common knowledge.
3.1. Language
Extending Cooper et al.’s [13] idea of seeing propositional variables, our model is based on a model of functional
STRIPS (F-STRIPS) [17], which uses variables and domains, rather than just propositions. We allow agents to see
variables with discrete and continuous domains.
3.1.1. Model
We define an epistemic planning problem as a tuple (Agt,V,D,O, I,G), in which Agt is a set of agents, V is a set
of variables, D stands for domains for each variable, in which domains can be discrete or continuous, I and G are
the initial state and goal states respectively, and both of them are also bounded by V and D. Specifically, they should
be assignments for some or all variables in V , or relations over these. O is the set of operators, with argument in the
terms of variables from V .
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3.1.2. Epistemic Formulae
DEFINITION 3.1.1:
Goals, actions preconditions, and conditions on conditional effects, are epistemic formulae, defined by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= R(v1, . . . , vk) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | S iv | S iϕ | Kiϕ,
in which R is k-arity ‘domain-dependent’ relation formula, v ∈ V , S iv and S iϕ are both are visibility formulae, and
Kiϕ is a knowledge formula.
3.1.3. Domain Dependent Formulae
Domain-dependent formula not only including basic mathematical relations, but also relational terms defined
by the underlying planning language can have the relation between variables. For example, based on the scenario
from Figure 1, loc(a1) = (0, 0) is a true formula expression the location of agent a1, while loc(a1) = loc(a) is a
false. In Section 4, we discuss the use of external functions in F-STRIPS in our implemented planning, which allow
more complex relations, or even customized relations, as long as they have been defined in the external functions.
For example, we can define a domain dependent relation in external function to compare distance between objects,
called @far away(loc(i), loc( j), loc(k)). This external function takes three coordinates as input, and returns a Boolean
value, whether distance between i and j is longer than i and k. In the scenario displayed in Figure 1, the relation
@far away(loc(a1), loc(b4), loc(b2)) would be true, while relation@far away(loc(a1), loc(b1), loc(b2)) would be false,
since b1 and b2 are equally close to a1. The definition of this function is delegated to a function implemented in a
programming language such as C++, and the planner is unaware of its semantics. However, for the remainder of this
section, we will ignore the existence of external functions, and return to them in our implementation section.
3.1.4. Visibility Formula
An important concept adapted from Cooper et al. [13] is “seeing a proposition”. Let p be a proposition, “agent i
knows whether p” can be represented as “agent i sees p”. Their interpretation on this is: either p is true and i knows
that; or, p is false and i knows that. With higher-order observation added, it gives us a way to reason about others’
epistemic viewpoint about a proposition without actually knowing whether it is true. Building on this concept, our
‘seeing’ operator allows us to write formulae about visibility: S iv and, S iϕ.
The seeing formulae represent two related interpretations: seeing a variable; or seeing a formula. The formula
S iv can be understood as variable v has some value, and no matter what value it has, agent i can see the variable and
knows its value. On the other hand, seeing a relation is trickier. S vϕ can be interpreted as: one relation ψ is a formula
and no matter whether is true or false, i knows whether it is true or not. To make sure i knows whether ϕ is true or not,
the evaluation for this seeing formula is simply that agent i sees the variables in that relation.
For example, in Figure 1, using the notation defined in Section 3.1.1, S a1 loc(b1) can be read as “agent a1 sees
variable b1”. In the case of seeing a domain-dependent formula, S a1(far away, loc(a1), loc(b4), loc(b2)) can be read as
“agent a1 sees whether the relation far away(loc(a1), loc(b4), loc(b2)) is true or not”, which is: “agent a1 sees whether
b4 is farther away from a1 than b2.”
3.1.5. Knowledge Formula
In addition to the visibility operator, our language supports the standard knowing operator Ki. Following novel
idea from Cooper et al.[13] on defining knowledge based on visibility [13], we define knowledge as: Kiϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ S iϕ.
That is, for i to know ϕ is true, it needs to be able to see ϕ, and ϕ needs to be true. In other words, if you can see
something and it is true, then, you know it is true.
3.2. Semantics
We now formally define the semantics of our model.
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3.2.1. Knowledge Model
Our model decomposes the planning model from the knowledge model, and as we will see in our implementation,
our planner delegates the knowledge model to an external solver. Therefore, in this section, we define the semantics
of that knowledge solver. The novel part of this model is the use of perspective functions, which are functions that
define which variables an agent can see, instead of Kripke structures. From this, a rich knowledge model can be built
up independent of the planning domain.
DEFINITION 3.2.1:
A model M is defined as M = (V,D, π, f1, . . . , fn), in which V is a set of variables, D is a function mapping domains
for each variable, π is the evaluation function, which evaluates variables and formulae based on the given state, and
f1, . . . , fn : S → S are the agents’ perspective functions that given a state s, will return the local state from agents’
perspectives.
A state s is a tuple of variable assignments, denoted [v1 = e1, . . . , vk = ek], in which vi ∈ V and ei ∈ D(V) for
each i. The global state is a complete assignment for all variables in V . A local state, which represents an individual
agent’s perspective of the global state, can be a partial assignment. The set of all states is denoted S .
A perspective function, fi : S → S is a function that takes a state and returns a subset of that state, which
represents the part of that state that is visible to agent i. These functions can be nested, such that f j( fi(s)) represents
agent i’s perspective of agent j’s perspective, which can be just a subset of agent j’s actual perspective. The following
properties must hold on f1, . . . , fn for all i ∈ Agt and s ∈ S :
1. fi(s) ⊆ s
2. fi(s) = fi( fi(s))
First, we give the definition for propositional formulae. Let any variable be denoted as vi, and R any k-ary domain
dependent formula:
• (M, s)  R(v1, . . . , vk) iff π(s)(R(π(s)(v1), . . . , π(s)(vk))) = true
Relations are handled by evaluation function π(s). The relation R is evaluated by getting the value for each variable
in s, and checking whether R stands or not. Other propositional operators are defined in the standard way.
Then, we have the following formal semantics for visibility:
• (M, s)  S i v iff ∃(v = x) ∈ fi(s) for any value x
• (M, s)  S i R(v1, . . . , vk) iff ∀v ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}, (M, s)  S iv
• (M, s)  S i¬ϕ iff (M, s)  S i ϕ
• (M, s)  S i (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (M, s)  S i ϕ and (M, s)  S i ψ
• (M, s)  S i S j ϕ iff (M, fi(s))  S j ϕ
• (M, s)  S i K j ϕ iff (M, fi(s))  K j ϕ
S iv, read “Agent i sees variable v”, is true if and only if v is visible in the state fi(s). That is, an agent sees a variable
if and only if that variable is in its perspective of the state. Similarly, an agent knows whether a domain-dependent
formula is true or false if and only if it can see every variable of that formula. For example, in Figure 1, S a1b1 is
false and S a1b2 is true, which is because b2 is in a1’s perspective (blue area), while b1 is not. The remainder of the
definitions simply deal with logical operations. However, note the definition of S i¬φ, which is equivalent to S iφ,
because all variables are the same. This effectively just defines that ‘seeing’ a formula means seeing its variables.
Now, we define knowledge as:
• (M, s)  Ki ϕ iff (M, s)  ϕ and (M, s)  S iϕ
This definition follows Cooper et al.’s definition [13]: agent i knows ϕ if and only if the formula is true at (M, s)
and agent i sees it. Using the same example as previously, Ka1@far away(loc(a1), loc(b2), loc(b3)) is false, while
Ka1@far away(loc(a1), loc(b3), loc(b2)) is true.
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Theorem 3.1. The S5 axioms of epistemic logic hold in this language. That is, the following axioms hold:
(K) Ki(ϕ → ψ) → Kiϕ → Kiψ
(T) Kiϕ → ϕ
(4) Kiϕ → KiKiϕ
(5) ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ
Proof. We first consider axiom (T). By our semantics, (M, s)  Ki ϕ is true, if and only if, both (M, s)  ϕ and
(M, s)  S iϕ are true. Therefore, it is trivial that axiom (T) holds.
For (K), based on our definition of knowledge, we have (M, s)  Ki(ϕ → ψ) is equivalent to (M, s)  S i(ϕ → ψ)
and (M, s)  (ϕ → ψ). Then, by our semantics, we have that (M, s)  S i(ϕ → ψ) is equivalent to (M, s)  S i¬ϕ or
(M, s)  S iψ. From propositional logic, ϕ =⇒ ψ is equivalent to ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. We combine (M, s)  ¬ϕ with (M, s) 
S iϕ to get (M, s)  ¬Kiϕ and similarly for ψ to get (M, s)  Kiψ, which is equivalent to (M, s)  Kiϕ → Kiψ from
propositional logic.
To prove (4) and (5), we use the properties of the perspective function fi. The second property shows, a perspec-
tive function for agent i on state s converges after the first nested iteration, which means (M, fi(s)) ≡ (M, fi(fi(s))).
Therefore, whenever (M, fi(s))  ψ, then ψ also holds in (M, fi( fi(s))), implying that Kiψ holds too. This is the case
when ψ is Kiϕ or ¬Kiϕ, so (4) and (5) hold.
3.3. Group Knowledge
From the basic visibility and knowledge definitions, in this section, we define group operators, including dis-
tributed and common visibility/knowledge.
3.3.1. Syntax
We extend the syntax of our language with group operators:
ϕ ::= ψ | ¬ϕ1 | ϕ2 ∧ ϕ | ESGα | EKGϕ | DSGα | DKGϕ | CSGα | CKGϕ,
in which G is a set of agents and α is a variable v or formula ϕ.
Group formula ESGα is read as: everyone in groupG sees variable/formulaα, and EKGϕ represents that everyone
in group G knows ϕ. DKG is the distributed knowledge operator, equivalent to DG in Section 2.2, while DSG is its
visibility counterpart: someone in groupG sees. Finally,CKG is common knowledge andCSG common visibility: “it
is commonly seen”.
3.3.2. Semantics
Let G be a set of agents, ϕ a formula, and α either a formula or a variable, then we can define the semantics of
these group formula as follows:
• (M, s)  ESG α iff ∀i ∈ G, (M, s)  S i α
• (M, s)  EKG ϕ iff ∀i ∈ G, (M, s)  Ki ϕ
• (M, s)  DSG α iff (M, s
′)  α, where s′ =
⋃
i∈G
fi(s)
• (M, s)  DKG ϕ iff (M, s)  ϕ and (M, s)  DSG ϕ
• (M, s)  CSG α iff (M, s
′)  α, where s′ = fc(G, s)
• (M, s)  CKG ϕ iff (M, s)  ϕ and (M, s)  CSG ϕ,
in which fc(G, s) is state reached by applying composite function
⋂
i∈G
fi until it reaches its fixed point. That is, the fixed
point s′ such that fc(G, s′) = fc(G,
⋂
i∈G
fi(s
′)).
Reasoning about common knowledge and visibility is more complex than other modalities. Common knowledge
among a group is not only everyone in the group shares this knowledge, but also everyone knows other knows this
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knowledge, and so on, ad infinitum. The infinite nature of this definition leads to some definitions that are untractable
in some models.
However, due to our restriction on the definition of states as variable assignments and our use of perspective
functions, common knowledge is much simpler. Our intuition is based on the fact that each time we apply composite
perspective function
⋂
i∈G
fi(s), the resulting state is either a proper subset of s (smaller) or is s. By this intuition, we can
limit common formula in finite steps.
The fixed point is a recursive definition. However, the following theorem shows that this fixed point always exists
(even if it is empty), and the number of iterations is bound by the size of |s|, the state to which it is applied.
Theorem 3.2. Function fc(G, s) converges on a fixed point s′ = fc(G, s′) within |s| iterations.
Proof. First, we prove convergence is finite; that is, when s′ = fc(G, s′), further ‘iterations’ will result in s′; that is,
s′ = fc(G, fc(G, s′)). Let si = fc(G, si), where i is the number of iterations. Then, we have si+1 = fc(G, si) = si. Since
si+1 = si, we have si+2 = fc(G, si), which means si+2 = si. Via induction, we have that for all k ≥ i, sk = si. Therefore,
once we reach convergence, it remains.
Next, we prove convergence within |s| iterations. By the intuition and definition of the perspective functions,
fk(s) ⊆ s, and si+1 = (
⋂
k∈G
fk(si)), we have si+1 ⊆ si. Then, as we prove for the first point, if si = si+1, then we
have reached a fixed point and no further iterations are necessary. Therefore, the worst case is when si+1 ( si and
|si| − |si+1| = 1. There are most |s| such worst case iterations until si converges on an empty set. Therefore, the
maximum number of iterations is |s|.
For each of the iteration, there are |G| local states in group G that need to be applied in the generalised union
calculation, which can be done in polynomial time, and there there are at most |s| steps. So, a poly-time algorithm for
function fc exists.
3.4. A brief note on expressiveness
The intuitive idea about perspective functions is based on what agents can see, as determined by the current
state. The relation between t = fi(s) and s corresponds roughly to accessibly relations (s, t) ∈ Ki in Kripke semantics.
However, only focusing on what agent exactly knows/sees means overlooking those variables that agents are uncertain
about. Perspective functions return one partial world that the agent i is certain about, rather than a set of worlds that
i considers possible. The advantage is that applying a perspective function provides us only one state, rather than
multiple states in Kripke semantics, preventing explosions in model size.
However, the reduced complexity loses information on the “unsure” variables. Theoretically, t = fi(s) from our
model is a set intersection from all the t that (s, t) ∈ Ki. This eliminates disjunctive knowledge about variables;
the only uncertainty being that an agent does not see a variable. For example, in the well-known Muddy Child
problem, the knowledge is not only generated by what each child can see by the others’ appearance, which is modelled
straightforwardly using perspective functions, but also can be derived from the statements made by their father and
the response by other children. From their perspective, they would know exactly m children are dirty, which can be
handled by our model, as they are certain about it. While by the k-th times the father asked and no one responds, they
can use induction and get the knowledge that at least k children are dirty. By considering that there are two possible
worlds, where the number of dirty children is m or m + 1, Kripke structures keep both possible worlds until m + 1
steps. Our model cannot keep this.
Therefore, although our model can handle preconditions and goals with disjunction, such as Ki (v = e1)∨(v = e2)],
it cannot store such disjunction in its ‘knowledge base’. Rather, agent i knows v’s value is e1 or its knows it is e2.
Despite this, possible worlds can be represented using our model, using the same approach taken by Kominis and
Geffner [10] of representing Kripke structures in the planning language. We can then define perspective functions that
implement Kripke semantics.
To summarise Section 3, we have defined a new model of epistemic logic, including group operators, in which
states in the model are constrained to be just variable assignments. The complexity of common knowledge in this
logic is bound by the size of the state and number of agents. In the following section, we show how to implement this
in any F-STRIPS planner that supports external functions.
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4. Implementation
To validate our model and test its capabilities, we encode it within a planner and solve on some well-known
epistemic planning benchmarks. Two key aspects in planning problem solving is the planning language and solver.
Since, as mentioned in section 2.1, we use BFWS( f5)[17], the advantage of F-STRIPS with external functions allows
us to decompose the planning task from the epistemic logic reasoning. In this section, we encode our model into the
F-STRIPS planning language and explain our use of external functions for supporting this.
4.1. F-STRIPS encoding
Any classical F-STRIPS [17] problem can be represented by a tuple (V,D,O, I,G,F), where V and D are variables
and domains, O, I, G are operators, initial state, and goal states. F stands for the external functions, which allow the
planner to handle problems that cannot be defined as a classical planning task, such as, the effects are too complex to
be modelled by propositional fluents, or even the actions and effects has some unrevealed corresponding relations. In
our implementation, external functions are implemented in C++, allowing any C++ function to be executed during
planning.
In our epistemic planning model (Agt,V,D,O, I,G) defined in Section 3, Agt is a set of agent identifiers, and V
and D are exactly same as in F-STRIPS. OperatorsO, initial states I and goal statesG differ to F-STRIPS only in that
they contain epistemic formulae in preconditions, conditions, and goals.
4.1.1. Epistemic Formula in Planning Actions
There are two major ways to include epistemic formula in planning, using the formula as preconditions and
conditions (on conditional effects) in operators, or using as epistemic goals.
Setting desirable epistemic formulae as goals is straightforward. For example, in Figure 1, if we want agent a1 to
know a2 sees b1, we could simply set the goal be Ka1S a2b1. However, there are some other scenarios that cannot be
modeled by epistemic goals, including temporal constraints such as “agent a1 sees b2 all the time” or “target b4 needs
to secretly move to the other side without been seeing by any agents”. Each of those temporal epistemic constraints
can be handled by a Boolean variable and getting the external functions to determine whether the constraint holds at
each state of the plan. If the external function returns false, we ‘fail’ that plan.
In addition, epistemic formula can be in the precondition of the operators directly. For example, in Figure 1, if
the scenario is continued surveillance of b2 over the entire plan, then the operator turn(a1, d) would have that either
S a1b2 ∨ S a2b2 as the precondition, after a1 turns d degree as one of the preconditions.
As for the encoding O, I and G, besides the classical F-STRIPS planning parts, all the formulae are encoded as
calls to external functions.
4.2. External Functions
External functions take variables as input, and return the evaluated result based on the current search state. It is
the key aspect that allows us to divide epistemic reasoning from search. Therefore, unlike compilation approaches to
epistemic planning that compile new formula or normal forms that may never be required, our epistemic reasoning
using lazy evaluation, which we hypothesise can significantly reduce the time complexity for most epistemic planning
problems.
4.2.1. Agent perspective functions
As briefly mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the perspective function, fi : S → S , is a function that takes a state and
returns the local state from the perspective of agent i. Compared to Kripke structures, the intuition is to only define
which variables an agent sees. Individual and group knowledge all derive from this.
Once we have domain-specific perspective functions for each agent, or just one implementation for homogenous
agents, our framework implementation takes care of the remaining parts of epistemic logic. Given a domain-specific
perspective function, we have implemented a library of external functions that implement the semantics of Ki, DS i,
DKi,CS i, andCKi, using the underlying domain-specific perspective functions. The modeller simply needs to provide
the perspective function for their domain, if a suitable one is not already present in our library.
For example, in Figure 1, global state s covers the whole flat field. fa1(s) is the blue area, and fa2 (s) is the yellow
area, which means in agent a1’s perspective, the world is the blue part, and for agent a2, the world is only the yellow
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part. Further more, in agent a1’s perspective, what agent a2 sees, can be represented by the intersection between those
two coloured areas, which is actually fa2( fa1(s)). The interpretation is that, agent a1 only considers state l = fa1(s) is
the “global state” for him, and inside that state, agent a2’s perspective is fa2(l).
To be more specific about perspective functions, assume the global state s contains all variables for {a1, a2, b1, b2,
b3, b4}, such as locations, the directions agents are facing, etc. Based on the current set up from Figure 1, we can
implement fi for any agent i with the following Euclidean geometric calculation:
[| arctan(
|y(a1) − y(a2)|
x(a1) − x(a2)
) − dir(a1)| ≤
range(a1)
2
]
⊕
[| arctan(
|y(a1) − y(a2)|
x(a1) − x(a2)
) − dir(a1)| ≥
360 − range(a1)
2
] (1)
The perspective function takes all agents’ locations, directions and vision angles, along with target location as
input, and returns those agents and objects who fall instead these regions. On each variable for both agents, fa1(s) =
{a1, a2, b2, b3} and fa2(s) = {a1, a2, b1, b2}. Our library can then reason about knowledge operator.
While such an approach could be directly encoded using proposition in classical planning, we assert that the
resulting encoding would be tediously difficult and error prone.
Their distributed knowledge would be derived from the union over their perspectives, which is the whole world s
except all variables for b4. Both agents would know every variables in the intersection of their perspectives, {a1, a2, b2},
while it is also the same as what they commonly knows.
However, if we alter the scenario a bit by turning a1 180
◦, then the EK would work similar as one level perspective
functions, while CK is empty. In the new scenario, fa1 (s) would become {a1, b1}, and EK becomes {a1, b1}. When
finding the converged perspective for a1 and a2, fa1({a1, b1}) stays the same, but the perspective for a2 results in an
empty world. The intersection over their perspective does not have a2, which means a2 does not exist in at least one
of the agent’s (a1) perspectives from the group.
However, the above implementation of the perspective function is only useful for Euclidean planes. One of the
novelties in this paper is that we define our implementation to support arbitrary perspective functions, which can be
provided by the modeller as new external functions. Therefore, an agent’s perspective function would be able to
handle any problem with a proper set of visibility rules to be defined. Basically, in our implementation, a perspective
function can take any state variable from the domain model, and converts it into its the agent’s perspective state. Then,
following the property that fi(s) ⊆ s, the function applies the domain-specific visibility rules on all the variables to
gain the agent’s local state. From there, the semantics outlined in Section 3 are handled by our library.
Therefore, we can simply define our external function on different epistemic problem by providing different im-
plementations of fi. For example, the only difference between the external function’s implementation on Corridor and
Grapevine benchmarks from Section 5, is that in Corridor, the visibiility rules are that an agent can see within the
current room and the adjacent room, while in Grapevine, the agent can only see within the current room. Moreover,
in order to implement epistemic planning problems for e.g. a thtee-dimensional Euclidean plane, we need to modify
the perspective functions based on the geometric model.
From a practical perspective, this means that modellers provide: (1) a planning model that uses epistemic formula;
and (2) domain-specific implementations for f1, . . . , fn. Linking the epistemic formula in the planning model to the
perspective functions is delegated to our library.
4.2.2. Domain dependent functions
Domain dependent functions are customised relations for each set of problems, corresponding to R(v1, . . . , vk) in
Section 3, and can be any domain specific functions that are implementable as external functions.
Overall, the implementation of our model is not as direct as other classical F-STRIPS planning problems or
epistemic planning problems. However, as we demonstrate in the next section, it is scalable and flexible enough to
find valid solutions to many epistemic planning problems.
5. Experiments & Results
In this section, we evaluate our approach on four problems: Corridor [10], Grapevine [8], Big Brother Logic
(BBL) [14], and Social-media Network (SN). Corridor and Grapevine are well-known epistemic planning problems,
which we use to compare actual performance of our model against an existing state-of-the-art planner. BBL is a model
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of the Big Brother Logic in a two-dimensional continuous domain, which we used to demonstrate the expressiveness
of our model. In addition, to demonstrate our model’s capability of reasoning about group knowledge, we inherit
the classical Gossip Problem, and create our own version, called Social-media Network. Hereafter, we assume any
knowledge formula Kav is supplied with correct value e, which means its equivalent with Kav = e, unless the value is
specified.
5.1. Benchmark problems
In this section, we briefly describe the corridor and grapevine problems, which are benchmark problems that we
use to compare against Muise et al.’s epistemic planner [8], which compiles to classical planning.
Corridor. The corridor problem was originally presented by Kominis and Geffner[10]. It is about selective commu-
nication among agents. The basic set up is in a corridor of rooms, in which there are several agents. An agent is able
to move around adjacent rooms, sense the secret in a room, and share the secret. The rule of communication is that
when an agent shares the secret, all the agents in the same room or adjacent rooms would know.
The goals in this domain are to have some agents knowing the secret and other agents not knowing the secret.
Thus, the main agent needs to get to the right room and communication to avoid the secret being overheard.
Grapevine. Grapevine, proposed by Muise et al.[8], is a similar problem to Corridor. With only two rooms available
for agents, the scenario makes sharing secrets while hiding from others more difficult. The basic set up is each agent
has their own secret, and they can share their secret among everyone in the same room. Since there are only two
rooms, the secret is only shared within the room. The basic actions for agents are moving between rooms and sharing
his secret.
To evaluate computational performance of our model, we compare to Muise et al.[8]’s PDKB planner. They have
several test cases for Corridor and Grapevine. In addition, to test how the performance is influenced by the problem,
we created new problems that varied some of the parameters, such as the number of agents, the number of goal
conditions and also depth of epistemic relations.
The PDKB planner converts epistemic planning problems into classical planning, which results in a significant
number of propositions when the depth or number of agents increased. We tried to submit the converted classical
planning problem to the same planner that our model used, BFWS (R) planner, to maintain a fair comparison. How-
ever, since the computational cost of the novelty check in BFWS (R) planner increases with size of propositions, the
planning costs was prohibitively expensive. Therefore, for comparison, we use the default ff planner that is used by
Muise et al..
We ran the problems on both planners using a Linux machine with 1 CPU and 10 gigabyte memory. We measure
the number of atoms (fluents) and number of nodes generated during the search to compare the size of same problem
modelled by different methods. We also measured the total time for both planners to solve the problem, and the time
they taken to reasoning about the epistemic relations, which correspond to the time taken to call external functions for
our solution (during planning), and the time taken to convert the epistemic planning problem into classical planning
problem in the PDKB solution (before planning).
We show the results of the problems in Table 1, in which |a| specifies the number of agents, d the maximum depth
of a nested epistemic query, |g| the number of goals, |atom| the number of atomic fluents, |gen| the number of generated
nodes in the search, and |calls| the number of calls made to external functions.
From the results, it is clear that the complexity of the PDKB approach grows exponentially on both number of the
agents and depth of epistemic relations (we ran out of memory in the final Grapevine problem), while in our approach,
those features do not have a large affect. However, epistemic reasoning in our approach (calls to the external solver),
has a significant influence on the performance for our solution. Since the F-STRIPS planner we use checks each goal
at each node in the search, the complexity is in O(|g| ∗ |gen|). While this is exponential in the size of the original
problem (because |gen| is exponential), the compuational cost is significantly lower than the compilation in the PDKB
approach.
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Problem
Parameters Our Model PDKB
|a| d |g| |atom| |gen| |calls|
TIME(s)
|atom| |gen|
TIME(s)
Calls Total Compile Total
Corridor 3 1 2 13 15 48 0.001 0.004 54 21 0.148 0.180
7 1 2 13 15 48 0.002 0.005 70 21 0.186 0.195
3 3 2 13 15 48 0.003 0.007 558 21 0.635 0.693
6 3 2 13 15 48 0.005 0.008 3810 21 5.732 6.324
7 3 2 13 15 48 0.005 0.008 5950 21 9.990 11.13
8 3 2 13 15 48 0.006 0.009 8778 21 14.14 15.68
3 4 2 13 15 48 0.006 0.009 3150 21 3.354 3.752
3 5 2 13 15 48 0.006 0.009 18702 21 25.69 29.54
Grapevine 4 1 2 346 10 48 0.002 0.006 96 22 0.429 0.469
4 2 2 346 10 48 0.002 0.007 608 5 2.845 3.168
4 1 4 346 23 144 0.005 0.009 96 11 0.428 0.468
4 2 4 346 23 144 0.006 0.010 608 11 2.885 3.178
4 1 8 346 368 1200 0.040 0.047 96 529 0.381 0.455
4 2 8 346 368 1200 0.050 0.057 608 1234 3.450 4.409
4 3 8 346 368 1200 0.068 0.073 4704 14 28.66 30.72
8 1 2 546 18 48 0.003 0.010 312 5 3.025 3.321
8 2 2 546 18 48 0.003 0.010 4408 5 54.35 58.80
8 1 4 546 43 144 0.008 0.016 312 11 2.546 2.840
8 2 4 546 43 144 0.008 0.016 4408 11 55.33 59.78
8 1 8 546 1854 4528 0.238 0.268 312 2002 2.519 3.752
8 2 8 546 1854 4528 0.322 0.294 4408 4371 54.90 228.1
8 3 8 546 1854 4528 0.394 0.421 − − − −
Table 1: Results for the Corridor and Grapevine Problems
5.2. Big Brother Logic
Big Brother Logic (BBL) is a problem that first discussed by Gasquet et al. [14]. The basic environment is on a
two-dimensional space called “Flatland” without any obstacles. There are several stationary and transparent cameras;
that is, cameras can only rotate, and do not have volume, so they do not block others’ vision. In our scenario, we allow
cameras to also move in Flatland.
5.2.1. Examples
Let a1 and a2 be two cameras in Flatland. Camera a1 is located at (5, 5), and camera a2 at (15, 15). Both cameras
have an 90◦ range. Camera a1 is facing north-east, while camera a2 is facing south-west. There are three objects with
values o1 = 1, o2 = 2 and o3 = 3, located at (1, 1), (10, 10) and (19, 19) respectively. For simplicity, we assume only
camera a1 can move or turn freely, and camera a2, o1, o2 and o3 are fixed. Figure 2 visualises the problem set up.
This problem can be represented by the tuple (V,D,O, I,G,F), where:
• V = {x, y, direction, query}
• D : dom(x) = dom(y) = {−20, . . . , 20}; dom(direction) = {−179, . . . , 180}; and, dom(query) = {0, 1}
• O : move(dx, dy) and turn(d)
• I = {x = 5, y = 5, direction = 45}
• G = {query = 1}
• F : @check: query 7→ {true, f alse},
15
a1
(5,5)
a2
(15,15)
o2
(10,10)
o1
(1,1)
o3
(19,19)
Figure 2: Example for Big Brother Logic set up
in which query is a goal query, which we describe later.
This is just a simple example to demonstrate our model. Variables x and y represent coordinates of camera a1, and
direction determines which way a1 is facing. Since a2 and all other objects are fixed, we model them in an external
state handled by the external functions, which lightens the domain and reduces the state space. However, we could
also model the positions of these as part of the planning model if desired. For the domain of the variables, although
the F-STRIPS planner we used does not support using real numbers, using integers is enough to show that our model
can work on continuous problems.
We need to check the knowledge queries in the actions (precondition, conditional-effects), or goals. Both action
move(dx, dy) and action turn(d) can change agents’ perspectives, and therefore, can influence knowledge. To simplify
the problem, instead of moving 1 or turning 1 degree per action, we can set up a reasonable boundary for actions, such
as turning ±45 degree per action and move at speed of 2 for each direction on x and y.
As for the goal conditions, some queries can be achieved for the problem in Figure 2 without doing any actions,
such as:
1. Single Knowledge query: ¬Ka2o3; Ka1o3
2. Nested Knowledge query: ¬Ka1S a2o3; S a1S a2o3
3. Group Knowledge query: Ka1 ,a2o3; Ka1,a2o2
4. Distributed Knowledge query: ¬DKa1 ,a2(o1, 3); DKa1 ,a2(o1, 1)
5. Common Knowledge query: CKa1 ,a2o2; CKa1 ,a2S a1o3
Most of them are intuitive. From goal 2, although S a1S a2o3 is true because a1 can see a2’s location, range of vision
and direction, so a1 knows whether a2 can see o3, the formula Ka1S a2o3 is false because there is no action that a1 can
do to make a2 see o3. For goal 5, CKa,bS a1o3 is true without any action, because, by calling the external function, the
common local state for a1 and a2 would be the location of all three values, both a1 and a2 and the value of o2. Then,
S a1o3 would be evaluated true based on the common local state.
In addition, there are some query that would be achieved through valid plans:
1. Ka1 ,a2o1: move(−2,−2), move(−2,−2)
2. CKa1 ,a2o1: move(−2,−2), move(−2,−2)
3. S a2S a1o1 : move(−2, 2), move(−2, 2)
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4. Ka1o1 ∧ ¬Ka2Ka1o1(BBL11): move(−2, 1), move(−2, 2), move(−1, 2), move(0, 2), move(0, 2), move(0, 2),
turn(−45), turn(−44)
5. ¬Ka1S a2S a1o1 ∧ S a1o1(BBL12): turn(−44), turn(−45), turn(−45), move(1, 2), move(2, 2), move(2, 2),
move(2, 2), move(2, 2), move(2, 2), move(−1, 2)
The first one is clear. There is more than one way to let both of them know value o1, and the planner returns the
optimal solution. The second one is also intuitive: to achieve common knowledge in a BBL problem, they need to
both see the item and both see each other. The difference between the last two are a bit trickier. To avoid a2 that knows
whether a1 can see o1, the cheapest plan returned by planner was for a1 to move out of a2’s eye sight. The last one
is the most difficult to solve. Not only should a1 see o1, but also a1 should know that originally a2 cannot see that a1
sees o1. This is done by decomposing into three facts: “a1 sees o1”;“a2 cannot see whether a1 sees o1”; and, “a1 can
see that whether a2 can see whether a1 sees o1”.
5.2.2. Results
Table 3 shows the results for our problems in the BBL domain. A plan of∞ means that the problem is unsolvable
– no plan exists. While the perspective function in BBL depends on a geometric model based on agent’s position,
direction and facing angle, the results show that with proper usage of our functional STRIPS planner, we can represent
continuous domains. Our agent epistemic solver is able to reason about other the agents’ epistemic states (vision) and
derive plans based on these for non-trivial intricate goal that we believe would be difficult to encode propositionally,
demonstrating that our model can handle important problems in vision-based domains.
Problem
Parameters Performance
|a| d |g| |p| |gen| |exp| |calls|
TIME(s)
Goal
calls Total
BBL01 2 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.000 0.002 Ka1o2
BBL02 2 1 1 2 115 2 232 0.007 0.009 Ka1o1
BBL03 2 1 1 ∞ 605160 all 1210320 36.1 78.2 Ka2o3
BBL04 2 2 1 2 115 2 232 0.015 0.017 Ka1Ka2o1
BBL05 2 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.000 0.002 DKa1,a2 {o1, o2, o3}
BBL06 2 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.000 0.002 EKa1,a2o2
BBL07 2 1 1 2 115 2 232 0.019 0.021 EKa1,a2 {o1, o2}
BBL08 2 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.000 0.002 CKa1 ,a2o2
BBL09 2 1 1 2 115 2 232 0.048 0.050 CKa1 ,a2{o1, o2}
BBL10 2 2 1 2 115 2 232 0.016 0.018 Ka1DKa,b{o1, o2, o3}
BBL11 2 2 2 8 59260 7509 187332 7.650 8.382 Ka1o1 ∧ ¬Ka2Ka1o1
BBL12 2 3 2 9 15842 592 47626 2.380 2.472 S a1o1 ∧ ¬Ka1S a2S a1o1
Table 2: Experiments Results for the Big Brother Logic domain
5.3. Social-media Network
The Social-media Network (SN) domain is an abstract network which agents can befriend each other to read
their updates, etc., based on typical social media models. We extend two-way one-time communication channels
from a classical gossip problem [13] into two-way, all-time communication channels, and add the concepts of secret
messages. By decomposing secrets into messages and posting through an agent’s friendship network, we model how
secrets can be shared between a group of individuals not directly connected without anyone on the network knowing
the secret, and some secrets can be shared within a group excepting for some individuals. The former would be ,ike
spies sharing information with each other through the resistance’s personal page, and the latter would be a group
arranging a surprise party for a mutual friend.
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Figure 3: Example for Social-media Network
5.3.1. Examples
Let a, b, c, d, e be five agents in the SN, with friendship links shown in Figure 3. Their friend relations are repre-
sented by full lines between each agent.
Let g be a friend for all agents and g wants to share a secret. We assume the social network is in g’s perspective
directly, and the network is fixed for simplicity. Let all the epistemic queries that we concern of be a set Q, and
p1, p2, p3 as three parts of the secret P. Any problem by this set up can be represented by a tuple (A,V,D,O, I,G,F),
where:
• A = {a, b, c, d, e}
• V = {(friended i j), (post p) (q) | i, j ∈ A, p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}
• D : dom(friended i j) = dom(q) = {0, 1}, dom(post p) = A, where i, j ∈ A, p ∈ P, q ∈ Q
• O : post(i, p), where i ∈ A, p ∈ P
• I = { (friended a b) = 1, (friended a c) = 1, (friended a d) = 1, (friended b e) = 1, (friended c d) = 1,
(friended d e) = 1 }
• G: see below
• F : (@check: q) 7→ {true, f alse}
(friended i j) represents whether i and j are friends with each other, which is a domain dependent relation, and q
covers all the epistemic queries. (post i p) specifies that the message p is posted on agent i’s page. The I covers the
friendship relations in Figure 3, and no message has been posted yet. Similarly, the action post is the only source for
epistemic relation changes. Therefore, we update all desired queries Q as condition effects.
Goals that we have tested are shown in Table 3. For some epistemic formulae between a and b, since they are
friends, simply posting the message in any of their personal page is sufficient to establish common knowledge about
the information in that post. But for the knowledge between a and e, for example, EKa,ep1, the message needs to be
posted on the page of a mutual friend, such as agent b. In addition, since a and e are not friends, in each of their
perspectives of the world, there is no information (variables) describing others. Therefore, both EKa,eEKa,ep1 and
CKa,ep1 are not possible without changing the network structure.
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Below are some of the sample goals that we have tested, with the identifying name from Table 3 and the plan that
achieves that goal:
• Kap1 (SN01), KaKbp1 (SN02), EKa,bp1 (SN03) and CKa,bp1 (SN06): post(a,p1)
• CKa,ep1 (SN07): ∞
• Ka{p1, p2, p3} (SN08), EKa,b{p1, p2, p3} (SN04) and DKa,b{p1, p2, p3} (SN05):
post(a,p1), post(a,p2), post(a,p3)
A plan of∞ means that the problem is unsolvable.
The other types of goals are secretive:
• Ka{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kb{p1, p2, p3} (SN09): post(a,p1), post(a,p2), post(c,p3)
• Ka{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kb{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kc{p1, p2, p3} (SN10): post(a,p1), post(b,p2), post(c,p3)
The aims are to share the whole secret with a while b must not know the whole secret, but can know some of it.
Some parts of it, such as p3, needs to be shared in the page that b does not have access to. Then, cmust also not know
the secret, the secret now needs to be posted in the way that b and c do not see some parts respectively, while a sees
all the parts.
Finally, we look on those two desired scenarios in the introduction of SN:
• Sharing with a spy:
Ka{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kb{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kc{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kd{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Ke{p1, p2, p3} (SN11):
post(a,p1), post(b,p2), post(c,p3)
• Surprise party:
¬Ka{p1, p2, p3} ∧ Kb{p1, p2, p3} ∧ Kc{p1, p2, p3} ∧ Kd{p1, p2, p3} ∧ Ke{p1, p2, p3} (SN13): ∞
Sharing a secret to some specific individual without anyone else knowing the secret can be done with the current
network. However, if we alter the problem a bit by adding a friend relation between b and c (SN12), and apply the
same goal conditions as SN11, no plan would be found by the planner, because c sees everything a can see, and there
is no way to share some information to a without c seeing it.
For sharing a secret surprise party for agent a among all the agents without a knowing it, the messages needs to
shared in such a way that a is not able to get a complete picture of the secrets. In the current set up of the problem
(SN13), since a sees everything seen by c, there is no way to held a surprise party without a knowing it. However, by
adding a friend relation between e and c (SN14), the planner returns with the plan: post(e,p1), post(e,p2), post(e,p3).
Table 3 shows the results for our problems in the social-media network domain. The results show that is able to
reason about nested knowledge and also group knowledge to achieve an intricate goal, which means our model can
handle variety of knowledge relations at same time within reasonable time complexity.
5.4. Discussion
Overall, computationally, our solution outperforms PDKB, which is state-of-the-art for epistemic planning prob-
lems. The number of agents and depth of epistemic relations do not not increase the computation time as rapidly as the
PDKB planner. In the terms of expressiveness, our solution demonstrates its capability to handle variety of complex
epistemic relations, such as, nested knowledge, distributed knowledge and common knowledge.
The results show that the computational time depends heavily on how many times have the external functions are
called, which is actually determined by the number of generated nodes and expanded nodes. Moreover, the number
of nodes involved in the search is impacted by some factors, such as, the length of the plan, the algorithm that the
planner uses, and also the scale of the problem itself.
The results also show that the external solver takes up a large part of the execution time. This is a prototype
implementation and this represents an opportunity for performance optimisation of our code base.
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Problem
Parameters Performance
|a| d |g| |p| |gen| |exp| |calls|
TIME(s)
Goal
calls Total
SN01 5 1 1 1 16 2 42 0.002 0.004 Kip1
SN02 5 2 1 1 16 2 42 0.003 0.005 KiK jp1
SN03 5 1 1 1 16 2 42 0.003 0.004 EKi, jp1
SN04 5 1 1 3 216 92 3286 0.484 0.489 EKi, j{p1, p2, p3}
SN05 5 1 1 3 216 92 3286 0.566 0.571 DKi, j{p1, p2, p3}
SN06 5 1 1 1 16 2 42 0.006 0.007 CKi, jp1
SN07 5 1 1 ∞ 216 all 7776 0.825 0.838 CKi,kp1
SN08 5 1 1 3 216 92 3286 0.216 0.221 Ki{p1, p2, p3}
SN09 5 1 2 3 306 107 7652 0.759 0.767 Ki{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬K j{p1, p2, p3}
SN10 5 1 3 3 614 189 20334 2.049 2.069 Ki{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬K j∧k{p1, p2, p3}
SN11 5 1 5 3 901 265 47570 4.841 4.886 Ki{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kother{p1, p2, p3}
SN121 5 1 5 ∞ 2808 all 505400 57.5 58.0 Ki{p1, p2, p3} ∧ ¬Kother{p1, p2, p3}
SN13 5 1 2 ∞ 432 all 31104 5.589 5.629 ¬Ki{p1, p2, p3} ∧ Kother{p1, p2, p3}
SN142 5 1 2 3 418 278 19964 4.049 4.073 ¬Ki{p1, p2, p3} ∧ Kother{p1, p2, p3}
Table 3: Experiments Results for the Social-media Network domain
6. Conclusions
In this work, we introduced a new epistemic planning model called the agent perspective model, driven from the
intuition: “What you know is what you see”. This perspective based model allows us to evaluate epistemic formula,
even nested, distributed or common epistemic relations, based on the simple concept of defining an agent’s local state.
Then, by separating the planning task from epistemic reasoning with functional STRIPS, we proposed an expres-
sive and flexible solution for most of the epistemic planning problems without an expensive pre-compilation step.
We implemented our model well-known epistemic planning benchmarks and two new scenarios based on different
perspective functions. The results not only show our model can solve the epistemic benchmarks efficiently, but also
demonstrate a variety types of epistemic relation can be handled. Our work is the first to delegate epistemic reasoning
to an external solver.
For future work, there are three ways to extend our model. First, extending the model to belief rather than
knowledge. The success of our model is dependent on the property fi(s) ⊆ s for perspective functions, which implies
beliefs cannot be false. Extending to belief would be an important step. Second, we can improve our model by
allowing simplified disjunctive knowledge relations, such as that proposed by Miller et al. [16]. Finally, investigating
event-based epistemic planning domains within our model would be another potential research direction. Our intuition
is that those problems would challenge our model, however, it would be possible to including seeing events as well as
seeing variables or agents.
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